It’s
amazing how much of the discussion of the Gaza war is based on the
supposition that it is still 1979. It’s based on the supposition that
the Israeli-Palestinian dispute is a self-contained struggle being run
by the two parties most directly involved. It’s based on the supposition
that the horror could be ended if only deft negotiators could achieve a
“breakthrough” and a path toward a two-state agreement.
But
it is not 1979. People’s mental categories may be stuck in the past,
but reality has moved on. The violence between Israel and Hamas, which
controls Gaza, may look superficially like past campaigns, but the
surrounding context is transformed.
What’s happened, of course, is that the Middle East has begun what Richard Haass of the Council on Foreign Relations has called its 30 Years’ War
— an overlapping series of clashes and proxy wars that could go on for
decades and transform identities, maps and the political contours of the
region.
The Sunni-Shiite rivalry is at full boil. Torn by sectarian violence, the nation of Iraq no longer exists in its old form.
The
Sunni vs. Sunni rivalry is boiling, too. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey
and other nations are in the midst of an intra-Sunni cold war, sending
out surrogates that distort every other tension in the region.
The
Saudi-Iranian rivalry is going strong, too, as those two powers
maneuver for regional hegemony and contemplate a nuclear arms race.
In
1979, the Israeli-Palestinian situation was fluid, but the surrounding
Arab world was relatively stagnant. Now the surrounding region is a
cauldron of convulsive change, while the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is
a repetitive Groundhog Day.
Here’s
the result: The big regional convulsions are driving events, including
the conflict in Gaza. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has become just a
stage on which the regional clashes in the Arab world are being
expressed. When Middle Eastern powers clash, they take shots at Israel
to gain advantage over each other.
Look
at how the current fighting in Gaza got stoked. Authoritarians and
Islamists have been waging a fight for control of Egypt. After the Arab
Spring, the Islamists briefly gained the upper hand. But when the Muslim
Brotherhood government fell, the military leaders cracked down. They
sentenced hundreds of the Brotherhood’s leadership class to death. They
also closed roughly 95 percent of the tunnels that connected Egypt to
Gaza, where the Brotherhood’s offshoot, Hamas, had gained power.
As
intended, the Egyptian move was economically devastating to Hamas.
Hamas derived 40 percent of its tax revenue from tariffs on goods that
flowed through those tunnels. One economist estimated the economic
losses at $460 million a year, nearly a fifth of the Gazan G.D.P.
Hamas
needed to end that blockade, but it couldn’t strike Egypt, so it struck
Israel. If Hamas could emerge as the heroic fighter in a death match
against the Jewish state, if Arab TV screens were filled with dead
Palestinian civilians, then public outrage would force Egypt to lift the
blockade. Civilian casualties were part of the point. When Mousa Abu
Marzook, the deputy chief of the Hamas political bureau, dismissed a
plea for a cease-fire, he asked a rhetorical question, “What are 200
martyrs compared with lifting the siege?”
The
eminent Israeli journalist Avi Issacharoff summarized the strategy in
The Times of Israel, “Make no mistake, Hamas remains committed to the
destruction of Israel. But Hamas is firing rockets at Tel Aviv and
sending terrorists through tunnels into southern Israel while aiming, in
essence, at Cairo.”
This
whole conflict has the feel of a proxy war. Turkey and Qatar are
backing Hamas in the hopes of getting the upper hand in their regional
rivalry with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The Egyptians and even the Saudis
are surreptitiously backing or rooting for the Israelis, in hopes that
the Israeli force will weaken Hamas.
It
no longer makes sense to look at the Israeli-Palestinian contest as an
independent struggle. It, like every conflict in the region, has to be
seen as a piece of the larger 30 Years’ War. It would be nice if Israel
could withdraw from Gaza and the West Bank and wall itself off from this
war, but that’s not possible. No outsider can run or understand this
complex historical process, but Israel, like the U.S., will be called
upon to at least weaken some of the more radical players, like the
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and Hamas.
In
1979, the Arab-Israeli dispute looked like a clash between
civilizations, between a Western democracy and Middle Eastern autocracy.
Now the Arab-Israeli dispute looks like a piece of a clash within Arab
civilization, over its future.
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